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Some scholars have recently expressed their doubts about the popular use of the term 
“post-secularism” and suggested that it is merely a short-lived fashion in social theory 
and philosophy, all too often used to gain access to research grants.1 Veit Bader may be 
perfectly right about the term itself, for in time it may indeed fall into disregard and 
disappear from use. Skepticism about its inflationary use is, we think, warranted. 
However, we also submit that, if severed from the temptation of proposing a new grand 
narrative, “post-secularism” can be useful for designating a socio-cultural phenomenon 
that will not wither away any time soon. 
Let us first consider the inflationary reading according to which the “return” of 
religion is interpreted as the shift to a new age or to a new type of society coming after 
the secular one. According to this influential reading, advanced by philosophers as 
different as Jürgen Habermas, John D. Caputo, and Gianni Vattimo, in this new age a 
transformed religion may play a fundamental role in the socio-political sphere and 
enable individuals to overcome unhelpful divisions between faith and reason. 
Habermas, for one, speaks of a new “post-secular society” in which religious and non-
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religious citizens engage, predominantly in the social-public sphere, in a process of 
mutual learning and reconciliation through dialogue and the exchange of reasons.2 For 
Habermas, religious and non-religious citizens can attain agreements and enrich public 
discourse by means of a rational dialogue, understood, in large part, as leading to the 
translation of sacred language into secular language. In turn, by developing Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading of religion, Caputo interprets the end of the secular age 
as the abandonment of the belief in the death of God and of the death of religion as 
proclaimed by, among others, Feuerbach and Marx. For Caputo, we have entered a new 
post-secular age characterized by “the death of the death of God,” namely by a shift in 
focus away from God as Reality and Truth to God as Love.3 He argues that the 
deconstruction of the question of the existence of God, that is, the onto-theological 
critique of religion, has a liberating political-religious impact. Bracketing the question 
of the reality of God opens up the possibility of experiencing God as passionate, 
impossible love beyond the absolute certainties and rigid institutional hierarchies of the 
Church. Finally, Vattimo welcomes the “Age of Interpretation” in which democratic 
citizens abandon absolutist claims about religious or non-religious nature, accept the 
hermeneutic injunction that “all is interpretation,” and value solidarity, friendship and 
love over Truth.4 In an all-too-familiar Hegelian gesture, this privileges the Christian 
paradigm as having a “world-historical” relevance. The coming of the Age of 
Interpretation is but the gradual unfolding of the consequences of Christ’s self-sacrifice, 
the self-emptying of an Almighty God and the overcoming of the violent logic of 
sacrifice itself. 
These divergent views of a “new age” that usually privilege the world-historical 
relevance of the Judeo-Christian paradigm are unpersuasive.5 Speaking of a post-secular 
age or society is often premised on the false assumption that Western societies have 
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become secular. But even in Europe, now the most secularized continent, religion has 
played an important role in society and politics, even when the gigantomachia between 
capitalism and communism eclipsed it between WWII and the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
The idea of a neutral and secular European state is largely a myth. Moreover, 
Habermas’s rational agents or translators are at worst fictional and at best a minority. In 
any case, people who are inspired by, and learn from, religious traditions do not 
represent a novelty that justifies speaking of a new society. Likewise, religious people 
who are willing and able to bracket the question of the existence of God so as to 
cultivate a post-Kierkegaardian impossible love or Vattimo’s preference for love over 
truth are far from being representative of the common religious believer. Rather than the 
differentia specifica of a new epoch, they constitute a limited group of philosopher-
believers, be they post-Heideggarian deconstructivists, influenced by Derrida and 
Caputo, or hermeneuts, influenced by Vattimo. 
Thus the current age is not post-secular but one of accelerated pluralization in all 
societal fields: in the field of legal norms, for example, as argued by Mariano Croce in 
“Is Post-Secularism Bad for Homosexuals?,” his exploration of legal pluralism and 
family law in this Special Issue. Western democracies in particular are neither 
conventionally religious, post-secular, or secularist: they are pluralistic. Together with 
forms of militant atheism, secularism and religious conservatism, post-secularism refers 
to one socio-cultural trend in the on-going dynamic of pluralization. However, if 
severed from the temptation to project a grand narrative, the term “post-secular” may be 
useful in describing a socio-cultural trend in contemporary democracies: a broad 
constellation of discourses and practices—philosophical, socio-theoretical, artistic, 
social and political, and so on—that are premised on the search for a complex, open and 
interactive relationship between modern reason and religion. 
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This search can aim at retrieving in non-dogmatic, non-authoritarian, and 
heterodox ways the salience of faith, sacrifice, transcendence, mystical insight, 
transfiguration, conversion and sacrifice, beyond the self-complacencies of 
conventional religion and militant atheism. Think of the new wave of philosophers, 
social theorists, writers and artists who have, in the past two decades, questioned the 
secularist opposition between religion and modernity, faith and reason, and looked for a 
common ground shared by atheists and the faithful alike. Although not always 
identified with, or self-identifying with the label “post-secularism,” Charles Taylor, 
Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Ronald Dworkin, Rohit Bhargava, Bruno Dumont, 
Michael Haneke, to name but a few, form a complex constellation of emblematic 
figures who search for alternatives beyond religious conservatism and a secularism that 
is hostile to religion per se. Dworkin’s religious atheism, based on the claim that 
“Religion is deeper than God,” Thomas Nagel’s interest in the question of the “religious 
temperament” beyond religion, Dumont’s explorations of a “religion without religion” 
are all, their differences notwithstanding, part of this search beyond old-style 
dichotomies. 
This cultural phenomenon is socially rooted in late modern democracies. The 
relative decline of church-going in Europe notwithstanding, the secularist worldview 
that is hostile to religion and predicts its disappearance has become increasingly 
implausible. Globally, religion is on the rise,6 and even in Europe, the most secularized 
continent, religious and quasi-religious experiences remain important for many of its 
inhabitants, often in heterodox, transformed and disguised forms. There has been a 
growing socio-cultural pluralization, a process involving multiple factors that are 
difficult to reconcile. Religious minority communities, mainly the result of immigration, 
have become ever more assertive in the public sphere; majority churches have been 
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reaffirming their influence on politics and law-making in new ways, as, for example, by 
the use of communication technologies and transnational lobbying. In several Western 
and non-Western societies, the interest in (individualized) spiritual-religious 
experiences has grown beyond established institutions. The film director Bruno Dumont 
conveys this mood: “one must recover words like ‘grace,’ ‘holiness,’ for the profane 
world, we should not simply grant organized religion a monopoly over this language. I 
desire a sacred humanism, indeed a spiritual life, transcendence, but without God or the 
Church.”7 
We can distinguish between two versions of post-secularism: rationalist and 
non-rationalist.8 Habermas’s perspective, which has largely been responsible for the 
current vogue of the term “post-secular,” is an example of the rationalist version. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Habermas advanced a post-Marxist version of secularism that ruled 
out the presence and relevance of religion in an emancipated society. However, some 
fifteen years ago, Habermas initiated a post-secular “turn,” motivated by empirical and 
conceptual-normative concerns, as well as by his interest in the historicity of modern 
reason. In Habermas’s version of post-secularism, religious values can legitimately 
influence commonly binding decisions once citizens translate them into secular norms 
and reasons in the public sphere. In his quasi-teleological view, translation can retrieve 
the seeds of moral truth contained in the plurality of religious voices; in so doing, it 
contributes to the gradual constitution of the unity of secular procedural reason. 
While Habermas’s post-secular turn has the virtue of mitigating the exclusivist 
consequences of his earlier secularism, it is unable to adequately consider pluralism. As 
Ulrike Spohn argues in “A Difference in Kind? Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor on 
Post-secularism,” Habermas fails to show that dialogue and translation necessarily 
guarantee the linear progress towards a pure, unitary reason. As he himself 
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acknowledges, communicative practices are embedded within, and interpreted on the 
basis of, ultimately non-reconcilable religious traditions, which is why there are no 
convincing criteria for ordering them hierarchically on a value scale. If this is so, it is 
hard to see how translations can aim at the “same perspective” espoused by religious 
and non-religious citizens at the level of ideal consensus. A minority or an immigrant 
group, for example, can gradually produce a new interpretation of the principles of 
political justice by drawing on their religious tradition. In time, they can form a majority 
that triggers a shift in existing democratic practice. Nonetheless, as religious traditions 
can neither be reconciled nor placed on a hierarchical scale, such shifts cannot be 
accounted for by the notion of linear progress whereby reason gradually converts the 
plurality of religious and non-religious voices into a homogenous unity. In other words, 
translations are incapable of taking the edge of singularity off religious traditions so as 
to transmute the plurality of religious voices into the unity of reason. 
The second version of post-secularism goes beyond the mainstream public 
reason approach of Habermas and others. Notwithstanding his post-secular turn, 
Habermas sees the philosopher as the “guardian” of the domain of reason, the one who 
can keep at bay the “intruding forces” of faith, transcendence, political theology and 
metaphysics. However, various continental and even analytic philosophers have 
advanced a more substantive challenge to secularism. They reflect on the relevance of 
political theological traditions for the varieties of secular state-religion regimes, and/or 
retrieve the experience of faith, transcendence, the holy, messianism, and the mystical 
for ethics and political philosophy in general. Several articles in this Special Issue 
pursue this line of reasoning. Alessandro Ferrara focuses on the issue of transcendence, 
while Colby Dickinson and Silas Morgan reconstruct Judith Butler’s view of religion 
and post-secularism through the diasporic experience.  
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This version of post-secularism is extremely diverse in terms of its claims and 
methodology. Let us propose a tentative division. At one pole, thinkers such as 
Dworkin, Taylor, or Cooke seek to integrate the concepts of faith, metaphysics and 
transcendence with the aim of broadening and refining the public reason approach.9 In 
his last book, Religion without God, for example, Dworkin advances a project of 
reconciliation by arguing that religion is essentially faith in the objectivity of value 
(moral, aesthetic, etc.). According to his “liberalism of reconciliation,” “what divides 
godly and godless religion—the science of godly religion—is not as important as the 
faith in value that unites them.”10 Joan Vergés Gifra takes issue with this claim in his 
critical review of Religion without God. Differences notwithstanding, Alessandro 
Ferrara’s “Varieties of Transcendence and Their Consequences for Political 
Philosophy,” on exemplarity, democratic ethos and religion, can also be understood as 
an attempt to rethink liberalism beyond the rigid proceduralist view of rationality.11 
While not outright dismissive of more rationalist versions of post-secularism, these 
approaches nonetheless assume a critical distance from them. 
At the very opposite side of the spectrum, there is Slavoj Žižek’s explosive 
mixture of messianism and communist-revolutionary politics in his philosophy of a 
violent Radical Act that draws inspiration from Saint Paul, Lenin, and Mao. At this end 
of the continuum, we also find the work of Giorgio Agamben, which is discussed in 
Mar Rosas Tosàs’s “Life under and beyond the Law: Biopolitics, Franciscanism, 
Liturgy.” Žižek dismisses different versions of post-secularism—the Habermasian and 
the Derridean, among others—as nothing more than the symptoms and accomplices of a 
capitalist order that needs to be overcome. Žižek’s Radical Act, emerging ex nihilo—a 
revolutionary break with the current order—is a sort of Messianic leap into the 
“impossible.” This form of Messianism, verging on irrationalism, is resonant of a 
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heterodox political theology rather than of Marx’s rigorous socio-economic analysis. As 
such, it offers an unappealing apology for the “divine violence” of a minority of 
revolutionaries that are not unlike Dostoyevsky’s nihilist revolutionaries. 
Between these two poles there are attempts to rethink democracy from the 
perspective of the other. These can take the form of comparative political theorizing,  
giving weight to the “otherness” of different theological-religious heritages and political 
contexts.12 Or they can take the form of Derrida’s radical-democratic project advanced 
with the tools of a universalizing philosophy of the otherness of the Other. Derrida’s 
deconstruction conceives an open dialectic between faith and reason, messianic justice 
and law. By re-appropriating tenets of Carl Schmitt’s political theology for rethinking 
sovereignty and decision, his dialectic goes beyond both Habermasian proceduralism 
and the Schmittian exaltation of the decision ex nihilo.13 
The complex questions raised by these different versions of post-secularism, 
which take us beyond the conventional debate on religion vs rationality, cannot be 
settled within the limited scope of these introductory remarks. But we believe that the 
interrogations posed by the authors of these essays will enrich the current debate about 
post-secularism by moving it beyond the rigidness of Habermas’s rationalism and 
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